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Fair Play the Inquisitorial Way: A Review of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal's Use of Inquisitorial
Procedures
Senior Member Joan L. Dwyer*
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act of 19751 was an innovative
and internationally acclaimed piece of legislation. The Act created the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT") as a specialised merits
review tribunal with jurisdiction to review decisions made under a broad
range of Commonwealth legislative provisions.2 By 1997, the AAT had
jurisdiction to review decisions made under 286 different pieces of
legislation.3
Over the years, the AAT's performance has been monitored. In
Osborne's paper, Inquisitorial Procedure in the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal - A Comparative Perspective, she pointed out that the AAT
was well established to pioneer the use of inquisitorial procedures and to
influence their adoption in the court system.4 She wrote:
* Since 1984, Joan Dwyer has been a Senior Member of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal established by the Commonwealth of Australia. Prior to appointment to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Senior Member Dwyer practiced as a solicitor in
Melbourne and in London, and as a barrister at the Victorian Bar. She had also been a
Member of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, and from 1981 to 1984 was the Chairman
of the Equal Opportunity Board of Victoria. Since her law student days, she has been
interested in the use of investigative rather than adversarial procedures. Senior Member
Dwyer attributes that interest to lively discussions with her father (who came to Australia
from Vienna in 1939) about the relative advantages of the English and the continental legal
systems.
1. Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, 1975 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au.au/legis/cth/consol aata1975323/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
2. Id. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 was one of a number of
Commonwealth Acts passed that year which together introduced a new system of Federal
Administrative Law in Australia. The Tribunal conducts a review on the merits of
administrative decisions made under over 300 separate Commonwealth Acts. The
membership of the Tribunal comprises Federal Judges, senior lawyers and other Members
whose qualifications, expertise or experience are relevant to the work of the Tribunal. The
Members of the Tribunal include doctors, engineers, veterans, pilots and business people.
3. Id.
4. Gillian Osborne, Inquisitorial Procedure in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal - A
Comparative Perspective, 13 FED. L. REV. 150, 150 (1982).
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There have even been calls for the use of some
inquisitorial procedures in ordinary courts of law. A
radical change in the ordinary courts seems at present to
be impracticable. On the other hand, the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal is still in a position to set its own
pattern of development. It has been given almost carte
blanche as to procedure and some wide inquisitorial
powers. . .. There is a chance that successful
innovations in procedure in the area of administrative
law could eventually have an influence on procedure in
the ordinary courts.5
I pointed out some of the reasons for our failure to be as inquisitorial
as some might have expected in my paper, Overcoming the Adversarial
Bias in Tribunal Procedures.6 First, there is a lack of a clear statutory
mandate for an inquisitorial approach. Further, we have received muted
support on the issue from the Federal Court, however, that has changed
to some extent since Bushell v. Repatriation Commission7. Also
attributing to our inquisitrial failure are the expectations of the parties,
the lack of budget allocation for expenses such as calling tribunal
witnesses, and insufficient staff to conduct investigations on the
tribunals' behalf.8
In a recently published paper, Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Procedures in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal,9 Thawley echoed
my concern about the muted support given by the Federal Court to the
AAT's use of inquisitorial procedures.'0 Parallel to De Maria, Thawley
concluded that the AAT's procedures were more appropriately described
as modified adversarialism than as inquisitorial." He suggested that the
quality of justice which applicants, particularly unrepresented
applicants, receive would be improved by a move towards the type of
procedures adopted by the Refugee Review Tribunal.' 2 Thawley
acknowledged that this would have significant cost implications, stating,
5. Id.
6. Joan Dwyer, Overcoming the Adversarial Bias in Tribunal Procedures, 20 FED. L.
REV. 252 (1991).
7. (1992) 175 C.L.R 408, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/highct/175clr408.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
8. Dwyer, supra note 6, at 252.
9. Tom Thawley, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal, 4 AusTL. J. ADMIN. L. 61 (1997).
10. Id. at 75.
ll. Id
12. Id
"[t]he adversarial system may be characterised as an unfair one from a
public policy/social justice perspective, but it is cheaper in terms of
public revenue."
' 13
The last section of Thawley's paper recounts his observations as to
the current functioning of the AAT.' 4  He comments on the
inconsistencies in the practices adopted by different members.' 5
It is uncertain whether there is more inconsistency between AAT
members than between court judges, but if so, I suggest some
explanations. First, in a strict adversary system, the rules are reasonably
clear. The room for individual variations is much less than in an area
such as administrative review where there are inquisitorial powers
which may, but need not, be used. There is no established culture as to
what is appropriate in a tribunal, and there are conflicting messages
from the courts. In addition, we were all taught and trained in an
adversary system. We therefore have had no training in the use of
inquisitorial powers. Further, there is no budget for that purpose, and
those legal professionals who appear before us do not expect us to adopt
an inquisitorial approach. There are also individual personalities and
cultural differences between members which, in this area of greater
flexibility, emerge more than in a strict adversarial system.
In spite of the hindrance to the development of an inquisitorial
approach, a search of the Tribunal's AATDEX computerised index of
decisions (for which I thank the AAT Melbourne Librarian, Ken Birch,
and my Associate Martin Clutterbuck) revealed over one hundred
decisions in which "inquisitorial procedures" were indexed. Thawley's
paper did not make reference to any decision where the AAT had
adopted inquisitorial procedures, nor, so far as I am aware, has any
academic work been done on an analysis of those decisions. 16 I consider
it a worthwhile exercise to record some of those decisions which
illustrate ways in which the AAT has used its inquisitorial powers over
the years, particularly because I am writing at a time when the survival
of the AAT is in doubt.
The Administrative Review Council, in its report Better Decisions:
Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals recommends drastic
structural change to the system of Review Tribunals, including the
substitution of a new tribunal, the Administrative Review Tribunal
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id.
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("ART") for the AAT.' 7 The proposal involves absorbing existing first-
tier tribunals into the ART; substantially limiting the right of second-tier
review, removing any requirement of legal qualification for ART
members, save for the President of the ART, and limited term
appointments, with appointment of members to no more than one
division of the ART. 8 On March 20, 1997, the Attorney-General and
Minister for Justice, the Honourable Daryl Williams, stated in
Parliament that the Cabinet agreed in principle to amalgamate the AAT,
the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, the Veterans Review Board, the
Immigration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal. 19 He
explained that the creation of divisions within the ART "would develop
and maintain flexible, cost effective and non-legalistic procedures
relevant to their jurisdiction."2°
Criticism that the AAT was too adversarial has contributed to these
proposals for change. In that context, it is relevant to identify instances
where the AAT has taken inquisitorial steps which would not have been
appropriate in an adversarial system.
I intend to refer briefly to the differences between an adversarial and
an inquisitorial system. I will then look at how the role of the AAT has
been perceived, before providing examples of the AAT adopting a non-
adversarial approach to decision-making. In conclusion, I will offer
some thoughts on how to assist and encourage tribunal members to
adopt inquisitorial procedures with confidence.
1. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ADVERSARIAL AND INQUISITORIAL
SYSTEMS
Lord Denning upheld a judicial ideal in a well known passage from
his judgment in Jones v. National Coal Board:2
17. BETTER DECISIONS: REVIEW OF COMMONWEALTH MERITS REvIEW TRIBUNALS, REP.No. 39, REp. FOR THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, (Admin. Rev. Council, Austl. 1995), at 140,
available at http://www.ag.gov.au/publications/better-decisions/Welcome.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2002).
18. Id. at 141.
19. Honourable Daryl Williams, Address to the Australian Parliament on Merit Review
Bodies: Amalgamation (Mar. 20, 1997), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/
intguide/law/adminlaw.htm#key (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
20. Id. It is not clear what the Attorney-General means by "non-legalistic procedures" in
the context of a review process which interprets and applies legislation, the construction of
which is often not clear.
21. (1957) 2 Q.B. 55 (Eng. C.A.).
In the system of trial which we have evolved in this
country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues
raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or
examination on behalf of society at large, as happens, we
believe, in some foreign countries ....
So firmly is all this established in our law that the
judge is not allowed in a civil dispute to call a witness
whom he thinks might throw some light on the facts. He
must rest content with the witnesses called by the
parties. So also it is for the advocates, each in his turn,
to examine the witnesses, and not for the judge to take it
on himself lest by so doing he appear to favour one side
or the other. The judge's part in all this is to hearken to
the evidence, only himself asking questions of witnesses
when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been
overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates
behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid
down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage
repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he
follows the points that the advocates are making and can
assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind
where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the
mantle of a judge and assumes the role of an advocate;
and the change does not become him well. Lord
Chancellor Bacon spoke right when he said that:
"Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of
justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned
cymbal."22
But not all judges have shared Lord Denning's view of the judicial
ideal. Justice Frankfurter explained in a dissenting opinion in Johnson v.
United States: 23
A trial is not a game of blind man's buff; and the trial
judge-particularly in a case where he himself is the
trier of the facts upon which he is to pronounce the
law-need not blindfold himself by failing to call an
available vital witness simply because the parties, for
reasons of trial tactics, choose to withhold his testimony.
Federal judges are not referees at prize fights, but
functionaries of justice.24
22. Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted).
23. 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
24. Id. at 54.
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Judge Sheppard of the Federal Court quoted Lord Chancellor Bacon
with approval in his thoughtful paper, Court Witnesses - A Desirable or
Undesirable Encroachment on the Adversary System.25 In his paper, His
Honour raised significant doubts as to whether the traditional adversary
system was really the best way to get to the truth of a matter.26 He
illustrated his concerns by reference to three cases which he had heard.
The first case Judge Sheppard discussed was Caltex Oil v. The
Dredge Willemstad.27 He wrote:
The plaintiff had to prove that those on the bridge of the
dredge were relying on the track plotter chart. The
dredge company brought to Australia from Holland the
deck officers who had been on duty. These were not
called by any party notwithstanding that they remained
in the precincts of the Court for the period of the
hearing. The plaintiffs case was found proved against
Decca upon the basis of inferences which were drawn,
but those -who could tell the Court whether they had been
relying upon the track plotter were denied to it as
witnesses.28
He further commented:
The plaintiff was afraid to call them in case they proved
adverse. No criticism of Decca for not calling them
could be made; they were not its witnesses. It did not
occur to me to ask counsel what their attitude to my
calling them would have been, but it seems doubtful
whether both would have consented.29
The second case Judge Sheppard referred to was Patton v.
Commissioner for Railways.3" His Honour described that he called two
eyewitnesses to an accident, sua sponte.3" Although they had been
present at the hearing, neither Counsel had been prepared to call them.32
They were the only witnesses who could describe the plaintiff's
25. I.F. Sheppard, Court Witnesses - A Desirable or Undesirable Encroachment on the
Adversary System, 56 A.L.J. 234 (1982).
26. Id. at 234.
27. Id. at 238 (citing Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136
C.L.R. 529 available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/highcourt/0/76/0/HCO00550.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id. at 239 (citing Patton v. Comm'r for Railways (1974) N.S.W.S., unreported, June
3, 1974).
31. Id
32. Id
behavior before he fell from a train.33 It seems to me that His Honour
was quite brave and innovative to have called the witnesses, on his own
accord, particularly bearing in mind that the hearing was in 1974. On
appeal, the court held the trial a miscarriage on other grounds.34 Judge
Sheppard insists in his article that his actions were appropriate.35
The third case Judge Sheppard described concerned a matter where
medico-legal experts were called by both parties, but neither called the
treating medical practitioner whose report was in evidence.36
Apparently, each party wanted the other to call the doctor in order to be
able to cross-examine him.37 Judge Sheppard suggested that he call the
doctor as a witness of the court, which was done. Each party cross-
examined him and the treating doctor's evidence was accepted.38
Judge Hope of the New South Wales Court of Appeal expressed
concerns about the inadequacies of the adversary system in the matter of
Bassett v. Host.39 The plaintiff was injured in a motor cycle accident
and sought damages for negligence.40 He suffered amnesia as a result of
the accident.41 There was a question whether the plaintiff or the
passenger had been driving the motor cycle.42  Once again, the
passenger was present at court, but was not called by either side as a
witness.43 Judge Hope explained:
A trial is not a game; it is an attempt, on behalf of the
community, to resolve in accordance with the law the
questions at issue between the parties. A system which
requires courts to resolve those issues in the
circumstances in which the issues in this case have had
to be resolved is surely deficient, for instead of assisting
the finding of the truth, the system has prevented the
court from having before it the only witnesses who could
have spoken directly as to what the truth was. In some
other parts of the world where the adversary system
prevails, this patent defect has been remedied as regards
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Naanouh v. Naanouh (1979) N.W.W.S. unreported, Oct. 19, 1979).
37.Id
38. Id.
39. (1982) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 206.
40. Id. at 207.
41. Id
42. Id.
43. Id.
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civil cases by enabling courts to call, or to require the
calling of, witnesses with adequate protection to the
parties by the giving of directions as to examination and
cross-examination, either generally or in respect of
particular issues. The present case highlights the need
for some such remedial measures in this state.44
In Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co.,45 Lord Wilberforce said,
"Judges are more than mere selectors between rival views - they are
entitled to and do think for themselves."46  In Accident Towing and
Advisory Committee v. Combined Motor Industries,4 7 Judge McGarvie
of the Supreme Court of Victoria quoted Lord Wilberforce's comment
in a pertinent response to a submission by Counsel that it was not
appropriate for the court to adopt a construction of the legislation which
the parties had not supported in argument.48
Lawyers' interest in trying new approaches and their commitment to
traditional procedures vary. Although the legal system requires judges
and other decision-makers to continue improving the legal system, there
is also value in the approach to the law which emphasises the need for
consistency, so that parties can have realistic expectations of the legal
consequences of their actions. Once a lawyer becomes a judge or
tribunal member, he or she will be engaged in balancing those
approaches. While the law must develop, these developments must be at
a pace, and in a manner, which is acceptable to the community it serves.
Our roles as decision-makers give us difficult decisions at times. We
may be required to balance conflicting values, all of which have
importance. The way we balance our conflicting values will depend on
our individual personalities and backgrounds.
An example of that balancing process arises where there is a non-
binding precedent that the decision-maker believes is not correct.
Should it be followed? In other words, is it better to be consistent or to
be correct? Both views have been expressed by high authority. Judge
Brennan, the first President of the AAT, argued that "[i]nconsistency is
not merely inelegant: it brings the process of deciding into disrepute,
suggesting an arbitrariness which is incompatible with commonly
accepted notions of justice."49
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. (1980) A.C. 198.
46. Id. at 212.
47. (1986) V.R. 529.
48. Id. at 547.
49. Drake v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [No. 2] (1979) 24 A.L.R. 634,
However, Judge Deane pointed out that the matter is complex:
There are many reasons for the desirability of
consistency in the making of decisions affecting rights,
opportunities and obligations under the law. Paramount
among them is the fact that inconsistency in the
treatment of those amenable to the law involves an
element of injustice. Particularly where there is
competition or correlativity between right[s],
advantages, obligations and disadvantages, equality of
treatment under the law is an ingredient of modem
concepts of justice and the rule of law ....
On the other hand, while consistency may properly
be seen as an ingredient of justice, it does not constitute
a hallmark of it . . . . Decision makers may be
consistently wrong and consistently unjust. The
Tribunal is not bound by either its own previous
decisions or by the content of government policy. There
have been and will be cases in which the Tribunal
concludes that it should refuse to follow a previous
decision of the Tribunal or reject or disregard the
dictates of a relevant policy of the government. The
existence of such cases serves to emphasise the fact that
each applicant to the Tribunal is entitled to have his or
her application for review decided on its own particular
merits. The desire for consistency should not be
permitted to submerge the ideal of justice in the
individual case. 50
There is a similar divergence of views about whether a judge or
tribunal member should act as an umpire, as stated by Lord Denning in
Jones v. National Coal Board,5 or a truth-seeker as suggested by Judge
Hope in Bassett v. Host.52
In my 1991 paper Overcoming the Adversarial Bias in Tribunal
Procedures,53 I made it clear where I stood. I wrote:
[W]here... a matter proceeds to a hearing or an
639, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/unrep194.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2002).
50. Nevistic v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 34 A.L.R. 639, 646,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/unrep361.html (last visited
Sept. 2, 2002).
51. See (1957) 2 Q.B. 55 (Eng. C.A.).
52. See (1982) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 206.
53. Dwyer, supra note 6.
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arbitration I consider that the Court or Tribunal should,
in order to do justice between the parties, see the
ascertainment of the truth as its aim in making findings
on contested facts ... in so far as I suggest the use of
inquisitorial procedures I do so because I believe they
will assist in achieving the aim of getting at the truth.54
In addition, I suggested some factors which make the adversarial
system particularly inappropriate in the realm of administrative review.
The most important were:
(i) Parties are not necessarily adversaries;55
(ii) There is likely to be inequality of power and legal skills between
the parties;56
(iii) Administrative review on the merits aids good government; 57
(iv) The interests of good administration require that the correct or
preferable decision be made, not only for the parties but to
provide guidance for the future.5 8
Finally, I endorsed the comments of Sir Richard Eggleston in his
article, What Is Wrong With The Adversary System?,"9 where he wrote:
To sum up, if the proceedings were seen as an attempt
by the court to get at the truth, and the lawyers on each
side were regarded as helping the court in its task,
instead of as independent actors, not responsible to the
court either for producing the best evidence available, or
for justifying any settlement reached, I believe that
litigants would receive better service from the legal
profession than they now get.6 °
2. PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE AAT
I have characterized the Tribunal as engaged in a task that requires it
to adopt inquisitorial procedures. As set out in my 1991 paper, the
Federal Court had previously only mutedly supported that analysis.
54. Id. at 253.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Richard Eggleston, What Is Wrong With The Adversary System?, 49 AUsTL. L.J. 428
(1975).
60. Id. at 431.
In Sullivan v. Department of Transport,6 Justice Deane, with whom
Justice Fisher agreed, said:
Section 33(l)(b) of the Act requires that the proceedings
of the Tribunal shall be conducted with as little formality
and technicality, and with as much expedition as the
requirements of the Act and of every other relevant
enactment and a proper consideration of the matters
before the Tribunal permit .... In the ordinary case, a
tribunal which is under a duty to act judicially and which
has the relevant parties before it will be best advised to
be guided by the parties in identifying the issues and to
permit the parties to present their respective cases in the
manner which they think appropriate. Circumstances
may, of course, arise in which such a statutory tribunal,
in the proper performance of its functions, will be
obliged to raise issues which the parties do not wish to
dispute and to interfere, either by giving guidance or by
adverse ruling, with the manner in which a particular
party wishes to present his case. Ordinarily, however, in
the absence of a request for assistance or guidance by a
party who is appearing in person, a tribunal under a duty
to act judicially should be conscious of the fact that
undue interference in the manner in which a party
conducts his case may, no matter how well intentioned,
be counter-productive and, indeed, even overawe and
distract a party appearing in person to the extent that it
leads to failure to extend to him an adequate opportunity
of presenting his case.62
Justice Smithers gave the Tribunal somewhat more scope:
The duty of the Tribunal is to satisfy itself whether a
decision in respect of which an application for review is
duly instituted is a decision which in its view was
objectively the right one to be made. Merely to examine
whether the administrator acted reasonably in relation to
the facts, either as accepted by him or as found by the
Tribunal may not reveal this. In this connection the
observations of Sheppard J in Home v. Locke are in
point. It is to permit implementation of the function of
the Tribunal, as so understood, that there has been
conferred upon the Tribunal extensive powers of
61. (1978) 20 A.L.R. 323.
62. Id.
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investigation. These powers are conferred so that the
Tribunal may equip itself to make an appropriate
recommendation or affirm the decision.63
Justice Fisher, as in Sullivan, agreed with the views of Justice Deane
in Commonwealth v. Scott.64 Justice Smithers repeated the views he had
expressed in Sullivan, in Drake v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs.65
By 1981, the prevailing Federal Court view of the role of the Tribunal
had moved somewhat away from a strict adherence to the adversary
system and along the lines suggested by Justice Smithers. In
Kuswardana v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,66 Justice
Fox said:
The other matter tending to obfuscation was that the
argument had not been presented to the Tribunal....
There is not, however, any requirement that 'the point be
taken' before the Tribunal, and we should be cautious in
trying to apply to procedures and practices operating in
an administrative setting those which apply in a judicial
setting. This is not to say that an administrative tribunal
may not, subject to the regulations governing it, find it
convenient or helpful to follow in some respects
procedures which over the span of many years have been
found by courts of law to be most conducive to the
interests of justice. They plainly must be able to accept
concessions of fact, but so to express the matter is to
confuse their function, which is one of administrative
inquiry, without rules of evidence....
Where there is material suggesting that the applicant
has at, or before, the relevant time become a member of
the Australian community it is in my opinion incumbent
upon the Tribunal to investigate the matter and to form
and record its decision.67
By 1985, in Adamou v. Director-General of Social Security,68 Justice
63. Drake v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [No.2] (1979) 2 A.L.D. 634
(emphasis added) (citations omitted), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrepl94.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
64. (1979) 41 F.L.R. 405.
65. Drake, 2 A.L.D. 634.
66. (1981) 35 A.L.R. 186.
67. Id. at 199-200.
68. (1985) 7 A.L.D. 203, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/
unrepI704.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
Wilcox went so far as to criticise the AAT for not seeking further
evidence, when the evidence put before it by the parties was not
sufficient to allow it to decide a relevant issue.69 His Honour said:
In fairness to the Tribunal, it should be said that little
assistance was given to it in relation to work prospects.
Neither party led evidence as to the job opportunities
which would be available to a person in the appellant's
position. Nevertheless it was the duty of the Tribunal to
address this matter, doing the best it could upon the
material which it had. If this material was thought to be
so inadequate as to provide no proper basis for a
conclusion, the Tribunal could have adjourned the
hearing for the purpose of having the parties place
relevant evidence before it. Subject to providing to the
parties an opportunity of dealing with any information
which it obtained, the Tribunal could have directly
informed itself upon the matter. However the problem
was to be managed it was incumbent upon the Tribunal
to make a finding on this question. Its failure to do so
constitutes an error of law in respect of the finding of
lack of incapacity of work.7°
Yet that was an isolated occasion. In New Broadcasting Ltd. v.
Australia Broadcasting Tribunal,71 Justice Davies again expressed
reservations about the Tribunal taking an active role in questioning
witnesses or adducing evidence.72 He said, "[s]uch a role does not stand
well with the AAT's function of providing a hearing to parties,
including the decision-maker, and of coming to an impartial and
informed decision after hearing what the parties before it put forward at
the hearing by way of evidence and submissions."73
However, the characterization I suggested to the AAT in 1991, as
engaged in a task which requires it to adopt inquisitorial procedures, has
now received endorsement by the High Court in Bushell v. Repatriation
Commission.74 Bushell concerned the reasonable hypothesis standard of
proof in a claim by a veteran for pension under the Veterans'
69. Id. at para. 18.
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. (1987) 73 A.L.R. 420, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
aat/unrep2817.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
72. Id. at para. 35.
73. Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
74. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 408.
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Entitlements Act of 1986.75 In that context, Justice Brennan said:
Proceedings before the AAT may sometimes appear to
be adversarial when the Commission chooses to appear
to defend its decision or to test a claimant's case but in
substance the review is inquisitorial. Each of the
Commission, the Board and the AAT is an
administrative decision-maker, under a duty to arrive at
the correct or preferable decision in the case before it
according to the material before it. If the material is
inadequate, the Commission, the Board of the AAT may
request or itself compel the production of further
material. The notion of onus of proof, which plays so
important a part in fact-finding in adversarial
proceedings before judicial tribunals, has no part to play
in these administrative proceedings.76
In spite of Justice Brennan's comments in Bushell, Justice Einfeld, in
Repatriation Commission v. Levi,7 7 still stated that the Tribunal was "not
permitted ... to go searching for solutions to issues which the parties
themselves do not raise or have an opportunity to meet. '78
Levi was another matter concerning the payment of pension to a
veteran. Kenneth Levi was suffering from a heroin addiction, which he
claimed was due to the fact that he had carried out an order to kill an
unarmed, wounded and pregnant Vietnamese nurse who was a prisoner
of war.79  One issue was whether the veteran was disqualified from
receiving pension because his condition was due to a "serious default or
wilful act" or "a serious breach of discipline."8 The Repatriation
Commission argued that the taking of heroin and the killing of the nurse
brought the veteran within the disqualifying grounds. 81
The Tribunal found that the veteran had an entitlement to pension and
the Repatriation Commission appealed. On appeal, the Repatriation
Commission claimed that the Tribunal should have considered whether
the killing of the nurse was a breach of the Army Act of 1881 (Imp),82
75. Id. (Veterans' Entitlement Act available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/
consolact/vea/986261/index.html) (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
76. Id. at 424-25 (emphasis added).
77. (1994) 33 A.L.D. 79, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
federal_ct/unrep6658.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
78. Id. at para. 46 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at para. 20.
80. Id. at para. 57.
81. Id. at para. 51.
82. Id. at para. 42.
which applied to the Australian Army, or a breach of the Geneva
Conventions Act of 1957 which set out the rules of war for the treatment
of combatants and civilians.83 Justice Einfeld said:
No evidence or submission of any kind relevant to
this issue was presented to the Tribunal on either of
these pieces of legislation, and no issue raised before it
of the interrelationship between the Army and Geneva
Conventions Acts on the one hand and the provisions of
section 9(3) of the other. Nevertheless the
Commission's submission in this appeal was that the
veteran should have been found by the Tribunal, and
should be held by this Court, to have by reason of that
interaction disqualified himself from entitlement to a
pension by killing the nurse.
This submission raises two issues for decision-first,
whether it is and should be held to have been a relevant
error of law by the Tribunal not to have dealt with
serious matters of this kind not put to it; and second,
whether the substantive argument is correct in any
event.84
His Honour may well have thought that the submission sought to
place too onerous a duty on the Tribunal, but I would suggest that he
may have overreacted in his response. He said:
It goes without saying that the Tribunal must apply
itself to the particular facts of each case and the law
which applies to them. But it is not required-indeed
except in a blatant case it is not permitted-to go
searching for solutions to issues which the parties
themselves do not raise or have an opportunity to meet.
The Tribunal simply could not operate in such
circumstances. Of course if an essential or obvious
matter is not addressed, a criticism might be appropriate.
But if complex and quite remote legal issues not raised
at a hearing could form the basis of the judgment, as the
Commission has submitted on this appeal should have
been the case, the party affected would simply have been
deprived of the opportunity of dealing with them, and
the whole proceeding would be invalid and abortive.
85
83. Id.
84. Id. at para. 44-45.
85. Id. at para. 46.
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With respect, it seems that His Honour confused two issues. The
AAT is permitted, not obliged, to go searching for solutions which the
parties themselves do not raise, but it is not permitted to adopt solutions
which the parties do not have an opportunity to meet. There is no
problem with the Tribunal adopting an inquisitorial stance as long as the
parties are given natural justice or procedural fairness.
Another interesting case is Perpetual Trustee Co. Canberra Ltd. v.
Commissioner ACT Revenue. 6 In that matter, both Justice Davies and
Justice Wilcox commented that the agreed facts before the Tribunal
were inadequate to allow an administrative decision-maker to deal with
all the matters to which it should have had regard.87 Justice Davies
joined with Justice Wilcox, in stating that the Tribunal does not
adequately perform its task of review of the administrative decision if it
leaves the task of identifying the salient issues solely to the parties.88
Justice Wilcox in a strong, concise judgment said:
However, I agree with Davies J that the procedure
adopted in this case by the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal was unsatisfactory. The Tribunal agreed to
determine the critical question in the case on the basis of
a statement of agreed facts that was patently inadequate.
If we were concerned with a decision of a court, made
on the basis of issues framed by the parties' pleadings,
there would be much force in an argument that, the case
having been fought on those issues, the unsuccessful
party should not be allowed a second chance. However,
we are not concerned with such a decision, but with the
decision of a body whose function was "to review the
administrative decision that is under attack before it".
Those words were used by Bowen CJ and Deane J in
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in
relation to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeal
Tribunal, but they apply equally to its Australian Capital
Territory counterpart. The statutory function of the
Tribunal requires that it form its own view about the
matter in issue. In approaching that task, it is legitimate
for the Tribunal to be guided by the parties as to the
salient issues and to accept relevant admissions of fact,
but the Tribunal should never permit parties to place it
86. (Austl. 1994) 28 A.T.R. 307, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
federalct/unrep6866.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
87. Id. at para. 4 (Davies J.) & para. 2 (Wilcox J.).
88. Id. at para. 4.
in the position of deciding a case on an artificial or
inadequate factual basis.89
3. THE ADOPTION OF AN INQUISITORIAL ROLE BY THE AAT.
Since the publication of my article on Overcoming Adversarial Bias
in Tribunal Procedures,90 I have found it easier to introduce inquisitorial
procedures in matters before me. Until I had "come out," lawyers
appearing before me may have thought that if they characterized some
suggestion I had made as to the running of a matter as "descending into
the arena," I would immediately scuttle back to my seat on the bench
and abandon my suggestion. However, once I have written that I
believe in using inquisitorial procedures to try to get to the truth of a
matter, I will not be frightened by the comment that I am doing so.
Certainly, the procedure I adopt must be fair and give both parties
natural justice. A course which will allow the Tribunal to be better
informed as to relevant facts, while allowing the parties to cross-
examine any additional witness or make submissions about additional
material does not conflict with the principles of fairness or natural
justice. I have encountered very little opposition from parties to my
frequent adoption of an inquisitorial role. I doubt if I can claim that the
AAT as a whole adopts an inquisitorial approach, but there are many
examples of the Tribunal doing so.
(i) Formulation of the Issues
Even though in an adversary system the formulation of the issues is
generally left to the parties, there are some issues such as jurisdiction
which not even a court can overlook.9' As was pointed out in
Kuswardana v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,92 an
administrative tribunal is under a duty to investigate a matter, and also
to affirm a decision if it is satisfied of all the critical ingredients. What
do we do when we are not so satisfied, but neither of the parties has
raised any challenge to our jurisdiction or to the basic findings?
89. Id. at para. 2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. See Dwyer, supra note 6.
91. See Minister for Health v. Charvid, (1986) 10 A.L.D. 124, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/unrep2369.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
92. (1981) 54 F.L.R. 335, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal-ct/
unrep4l5.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
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I confronted that issue in Nicholls v. Secretary to the Department of
Primary Industry.93 We sat as a three member tribunal for ten days and
heard evidence. The issue regarded the issuance of a fishing license to a
particular vessel.94 The legislation applied only to "an Australian
vessel." As I was writing the draft reasons for judgment, working
through the issues point by point, it became apparent that, though no
party took issue as to the application of the legislation, the vessel in
question was not "an Australian vessel" as defined in the legislation. I
requested the Registrar to write the parties outlining the difficulty. The
matter then came on for further hearing on the jurisdiction issue. The
parties could not satisfy the Tribunal that it had jurisdiction, so the
Tribunal held that it could not review the refusal of the license.
Another matter the Tribunal raised, which the parties had not
addressed, stems from Rowlands v. Commissioner for Superannuation.95
One issue was whether, if the applicant disclosed symptoms of her
tenosynovitis condition at a pre-employment medical examination, the
commissioner would have issued her a benefit classification certificate
("BCC") specifying that condition.96 The effect of a BCC is to limit the
superannuation payment made to the employee if he or she retires early
because of the specified condition.97 Because the examination was in
1979, the Tribunal said it needed to have evidence as to the
administrative practice in relation to the issue of benefit classification
certificates for tenosynovitis in 1979.98 The parties had not addressed
that point. When the Tribunal "pressed the point," a witness, the
director of the superannuation classification section of the Australian
Government Retirement Benefits office, agreed to do a computer search
to identify how many, if any, certificates specifying that condition had
been issued prior to 1980. 99 On the evidence resulting from the search,
the Tribunal concluded that it would be quite unsafe to find that a BCC
would have issued within the appropriate time frame.' The Tribunal
commented:
93. (1988) 22 A.L.D. 596, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
aat/unrep3289.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
94. Id. at para. 1.
95. (1988) 16 A.L.D. 589, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
aat/unrep3495.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
96. Id. at para. 14.
97. Id. at para. 25.
98. Id. at para. 26.
99. Id. at para. 25.
100. Id. at para. 27.
[i]n private duty bound, the Tribunal does also wish to
draw attention to its own role, in the matter. The
Administrative Appeals Tribunal does not have the
resources to be a fully inquisitorial body, but it has a
duty to seek out information which it regards as
necessary for the decision of the case in hand, and when
it identifies this need it will seek that information
through the parties or, having obtained it aliter or
through its own expertise, will expose it to the parties for
comment. Any suggestion that the Tribunal simply
remains content with the information proffered to it by
the parties is quite wrong.''
Much more recently, the problem arose again in Secretary,
Department of Social Security v. Southcott.1°2 The Secretary had given
a garnishee notice to Mr. Southcott's employer in respect of a debt
which arose because of an overpayment of unemployment benefit and
job search allowance. 103 The issue before me was whether the debt
should be waived because Mr Southcott had not knowingly made a false
statement. It was apparent from the documents that Mr. Southcott was
an undischarged bankrupt, but no the Tribunal gave no consideration to
whether the bankruptcy prevented the Secretary recovering the debt by
garnishee notice. I raised the issue at the hearing and asked the
Secretary to prepare a written submission on the point. I also asked the
Secretary to consider whether a notice given to Mr. Southcott had
adequately complied with the Data Matching Act Program (Assistance
and Tax) Act 1990. I decided that the Secretary could not recover the
debt by garnishee notice, both because of the bankruptcy and because of
the lack of compliance with the Data Matching Act. That decision is
now under appeal.
A similar situation arose in Howarth v. Commissioner of
Superannuation.'°4  In that matter, the issue was whether the
Commissioner should have given Mrs. Howarth an extension of time
under section 154(2) of the Superannuation Act 1976 to apply for
reconsideration of a decision denying a benefit classification
certificate.0 5 The certificate issued allegedly limited the benefits that
101. Id. at para. 28 (emphasis added).
102. (1997) No. V96/251 A.A.T. No. 11741, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep6634.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
103. Id. at para. 1.
104. (1997) No. V96/486 A.A.T. No. 11743, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep6635.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
105. Id. at para. 1.
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she was entitled to due to an early ill-health retirement. 0 6 Mrs. Howarth
applied for reconsideration approximately 14 years after the initial
issuance of the certificate. 0 7  The Tribunal questioned when the
decision to issue the certificate first "came to the notice of" Mrs.
Howarth.' 0 However, as the Tribunal considered the matter during the
hearing, I noticed section 16(6) of the Superannuation Act 1976 stated
that an eligible employee could apply for reconsideration of a decision
to issue a benefit classification certificate.0 9 Section 16(6) specified no
time limit."0  The parties were made aware of section 16(6). The
Tribunal asked the respondent's representative why Mrs. Howarth's
application for reconsideration was not accepted and dealt with under
section 16(6). The Commissioner for Superannuation did not provide a
satisfactory response. The Tribunal decided that section 16(6) applied
to the matter and set aside the decision refusing the request for
reconsideration."' Upon remitter, the Commissioner was directed to
reconsider the matter under section 16(6).' 12
Sometimes the matter which concerns the Tribunal is not a matter
which the parties have overlooked, but something to which they have
agreed. In Calderaro v. Secretary, Department of Social Security,' ' the
respondent conceded the matter, which seemed inconsistent with the
evidence.1 4 The Tribunal considered whether it should regard itself as
bound to act on the concession made by the respondent in this matter.
In R v Moodie.. . the Full Court of the High Court in a joint judgment
made it very clear that it is the duty of a Tribunal (in that case the
Student Assistance Review Tribunal) to satisfy itself on the matters
alleged before it, without reference to any concessions purported to be
made by the decision-maker whose decision is under review. Their
Honours said:
Once the review had been instituted then it is only
the Tribunal itself that had any function to perform or
any powers to exercise under the Act. What the Tribunal
must do is to give its own decision accompanied by its
106. Id. at para. 5.
107. Id. at para. 10.
108. Id.
109. Id. at para. 6.
110. Id. at para. 9.
111. Id. at paras. 70-71.
112. Id. at para. 71.
113. (1991) 23 A.L.D. 358, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrep4313.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
114. Id. at para. 28.
own reasons for its findings. It would not, on this view,
be open to the Tribunal to make an order by consent of
the authorised person and the applicant. Its functions can
only be discharged by giving its own decision.
The point arose in relation to this Tribunal in Kuswardana v.
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. Bowen C.J. said:
"The case before this court is not merely one of
parties agreeing upon what facts should be decided by
the trier of fact, nor a case of facts, peculiarly within the
knowledge of the party, being conceded. Rather, there
was a clear statutory precondition upon which the
Tribunal had to be satisfied and enough material and
evidence before it to raise the issue independently of the
parties' submissions. In these circumstances it was an
error of law not to consider and decide the issue of
immigrant status."
The Federal Court recently again considered the point in Minister for
Health v Charvid Pty Ltd. Woodward J., although he acknowledged that
counsel for the minister had dealt with a relevant consideration "in...
economical terms," in failing to consider that relevant matter the
Tribunal had fallen into error.
These decisions establish that there is an obligation on the Tribunal
to satisfy itself as to all relevant matters, particularly those that go to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal or qualifications of an applicant,
notwithstanding the fact that counsel for both parties join in a
submission or a concession. If it had been necessary for us to either
reject the concession or accept it, we would have given notice to both
parties of the fact that we were inclined not to accept it and would asked
for written submissions on the point. Such a course was adopted by the
Tribunal in Re Nicholls and Secretary to the Department of Primary
Industry. It appears to us to be the preferable course to adopt although
the High Court held in R v Moodie that it was not a necessary step to
take.
We decided not to take that step because, even if we were to accept
the concession made by the respondent, there are a number of reasons
why we still would not consider it reasonable to deem the claim for
sickness benefit to be a claim for invalid pension so as to justify
backdating the payment of invalid pension for 13 years.115
Although successfully appealed,116 Justice Gray expressly approved the
115. Id. at paras. 30-34 (citations omitted).
116. Calderaro v. Sec'y Dep't of Soc. Sec. (1992) 27 A.L.D. 393, at para. 46, available at
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Tribunal's comments to the effect that it was not bound by concessions
made by the parties. 17
Similarly, in Bond v. Trustee of the Property of Alan Bond, A
Bankrupt,118 the Tribunal referred to the fact that both counsel had
joined in asking the Tribunal to treat certain advances made to Mr. Bond
"as if they were gifts."' 9 The Tribunal said:
We are not prepared to proceed on that basis. In
Sullivan v. Department of Transport, Deane J said:
"In the ordinary case, a tribunal which is under a
duty to act judicially and which has the relevant
parties before it, will be best advised to be guided
by the parties in identifying the issues and to
permit the parties to present their respective cases
in the manner which they think appropriate."
In Australian Postal Commission v. Burgazoff, Davies J
affirmed that this tribunal should not follow an
inquisitorial process and added that the tribunal "never
itself makes investigations outside the conduct of the
hearing." Nevertheless we are bound by section 43 of
the AAT Act to bring in findings on material questions
of fact and must make a reference to the evidence or
other material on which those findings are based. We
can not proceed on supposed facts. To do so would
amount to giving an advisory opinion, a procedure which
is beyond the power of this tribunal. We are not bound to
accept concessions made by the parties: If it is
necessary in reviewing the decision before us, we are
entitled to consider issues not raised by the parties. 20
The Tribunal concluded that it was in a position to find as a fact that the
payments in question were gifts.' 2 ' It therefore made its decision on that
basis. 122
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/unrep4665.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
117. Id. at para. 5.
118. (1993) 30 A.L.D. 232, 235, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrep5l74.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
119. Id. at para. 11.
120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. Id. at para. 13.
122. Id. at para. 35.
(ii) The Decision as to What Witnesses will be Called
In a traditional adversarial proceeding, only the parties call witnesses.
Although Justice Davies stated in Australian Postal Commission v.
Burgazof'2 3 that the AAT "rarely calls evidence and never itself makes
investigations outside the conduct of a hearing," he indicated that the
Tribunal felt free to suggest to the parties other additional information
which ought to be obtained and sometimes appropriate means of
obtaining the information and bringing it into evidence. 2 4  That is
generally accurate, but there have been some matters where the Tribunal
has gone further and called witnesses or obtained information to put
before the parties.
In Tribunals where I presided, I have twice asked an ear, nose and
throat specialist to examine an unrepresented applicant suffering hearing
loss, prepare a report, and give evidence at the Tribunal.125 The
Tribunal paid the witness fees on both occasions, although the Tribunal
could have ordered that they be paid by the Commonwealth under
section 67(3) of the AAT Act. In Oakley v. Commonwealth, I said:
This matter depended on careful analysis of medical
evidence. Mr. P. Oakley in opening said that it was not
intended to call any medical evidence. He gave the
impression that this was because of the expense of
calling medical witnesses. The Tribunal indicated that it
would consider calling a medical witness itself if it felt
that was necessary. After having heard from the two
medical witnesses called on behalf of the respondent,
the Tribunal decided to use its powers under
sections 33(l)(e), 40(1A) and 67 of the AAT Act to call
a further medical witness. The Tribunal took this course
because the applicant's argument depended on an
interpretation of the medical evidence contrary to that of
the respondent's medical witnesses. Thus unless other
medical evidence was called there would be no medical
support for the view put forward on behalf of the
applicant. 12
6
The evidence called in the above case did not help the applicant to
establish a connection between his sudden deafness in the left ear and
123. (1989) 10 A.A.R. 296.
124. Id. at 298.
125. Trott v. Commonwealth (1985) 9 A.L.N. 131; Oakley v. Commonwealth (1985)
A.A.T 6670.
126. (1985) A.A.T. 6670.
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his firing practice in the CMF. Mr. Oakley and the Tribunal were
nonetheless satisfied with the thoroughness of the investigation of the
claim. 127 In the final analysis, the Tribunal had to decide the matter on
the medical evidence which suggested that Mr. Oakley deafness was not
that which resulted from noise exposure. 128
In Willey v. Repatriation Commission,129 the Tribunal suggested to
the representative of the Repatriation Commission that because of the
unsatisfactory state of the evidence, a report from a neurosurgeon
chosen by the Tribunal was needed.130 Again, the report was not helpful
to the applicant, but at least she and the Tribunal knew that her claim
had been thoroughly investigated. On numerous other occasions, the
Tribunal has arranged for a medical witness who has already seen an
unrepresented applicant to give evidence over the telephone when the
applicant could not afford to call the witness.
Attorneys in Donath v. Secretary to the Department of Social
Security' called a different kind of witness.'32 The issue was whether
Nazi restitution payments paid under Austrian legislation were "income"
within the meaning of that term in the Social Security Act 1947.133 The
witness called by the Tribunal was the executive vice-president of the
Federation of Australian Jewish Welfare Societies. 3 4  A Ministerial
statement explaining why such payments when made by the German
government were not to be treated as "income."' 35 The Tribunal asked
the witness whether he could explain the distinction in the legislation
between restitution payments made by the German government for Nazi
persecution and payments made by the Austrian government for Nazi
persecution. 3 6 The evidence did not allow the Tribunal to set aside the
decision affecting Mr. Donath, but it did expose an anomaly in the
legislation. 3 7 Within days of the witness giving evidence in the matter
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. (1989) 17 A.L.D. 314, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/
unrep3660.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
130. Id. at paras. 37, 40.
131. (1989) 19 A.L.D 124, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/
unrep3812.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002)
132. Id. at para. 20.
133. Id. at para. 6.
134. Id. at para. 20.
135. Id.
136. ld. at para. 21.
137. Id. at para. 22.
the Prime Minister announced that the anomaly would be corrected. 38
Another matter where the Tribunal called an unusual witness was
Morris v. Repatriation Commission.3 9 In this case, a widow claimed
that war caused her husband's cancer. 4 ° The widow advanced the
hypothesis that the impossibility of maintaining proper penile hygiene
while serving in Korea was a significant risk factor. 4 ' The only
evidence available as to conditions of service in Korea was a brief letter
from another veteran living in New South Wales.'42 The Tribunal was
aware that a Member of the Tribunal in Melbourne had served in
Korea. 43 It turned out that he had served in the same battalion as the
veteran. At the suggestion of the Tribunal, but only because both parties
consented, he gave evidence as to the conditions of service and the
complete lack of any facilities for personal washing while Mr. Morris
was in Korea.'"
(iii) Intervention by the Tribunal
(a) Investigations Conducted by the Tribunal
There are a few matters where the Tribunal has itself made
investigations outside the hearing and has then referred the result of
those investigations to the parties and invited them to make submissions
concerning the investigation. Commonwealth of Australia v.
Chomsky145  was a matter where the applicant was receiving
compensation for a condition described as Regional Pain Syndrome
("RSI"). 146 Conflicting medical opinions were before the Tribunal as to
whether or not the condition existed.'47 The Tribunal, through reading
the newspapers, had become aware of a doctor in Western Australia who
had stated in a letter to the papers that there was "recently published
138. Id. at para. 27.
139. (1990) 21 A.L.D. 293.
140. Id.
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. (1990) No. A87/180 A.A.T. No. 5959, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
au/cases/cth/aat/unrep3993.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
146. Id. at para. 1.
147. Id. at paras. 13-16.
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research" which pointed strongly towards a physical cause for the
symptoms of many RSI patients. 41 In those circumstances Deputy
President Todd said at paragraphs 43 and 44:
As I did not believe that such research had been put
before me by either party, I caused a letter to be sent to
Dr. Quintner in which he was asked to advise what
published research he had in mind. The letter stated
inter alia:
"It would not be proper for me to enter into any
kind of discussion with a person not called as a
witness in the proceedings before me, and I am
therefore specifically not asking you for your
personal opinion in any respect. I am however
not confident that the recently published
research to which you refer has been placed
before me by any medical witnesses on either
side in the proceedings. I would therefore be
grateful if you could simply let me have a
reference or references to the research in
question. The law would then require me to
submit that research to both parties in each case
before me for their comment if desired."
My action in contacting Dr. Quintner was no doubt
unusual, but so also was the problem before me. My
action was consistent with the views expressed from
time to time that the Tribunal should play a more
"inquisitorial" role, but in fact the inquisition was
limited and was conducted well within the rules of
natural justice and within the requirements of section 39
of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. The
parties were given copies of the exchange of
correspondence and of the material sent to me by Dr.
Quintner and were enabled to comment on it. The
material produced to me is contained in Ex. X.
Unfortunately, while much of the material contained in
Ex. X is of considerable interest, it has not resolved the
vexed question of the elucidation of the cause of regional
pain syndrome. 149
The Tribunal affirmed the decision that compensation payable to Mrs.
Chomsky should cease, but at least it did so being satisfied that it had
148. Id. at para. 43.
149. Id. at paras. 43-44.
not overlooked material which might have been of assistance to Mrs.
Chomsky. 5 ° The Tribunal also referred to that material in the matter of
Beer v. Australian Telecommunications Commission.5' However, in
that matter, the failure to achieve a clear diagnosis was not fatal to the
applicant's claim that she remained entitled to compensation. 52 The
Tribunal accepted her evidence and the evidence of the medical
witnesses called on her behalf and found that she suffered real pain.'
53
In Lukins v. Repatriation Commission, 154 the Tribunal considered the
nexus between alcohol consumption and colon cancer.1 55  The
Repatriation Committee Tribunal viewed an opinion on this issue in
another matter but, this opinion was not offered into evidence in
Lukins.156 The Tribunal stated that it was desirable that the Tribunal
endeavour to be fully informed as to matters relevant to the issue it had
to determine and produced a copy of the opinion which it put before the
parties in Lukins. 57
In O'Maley v. Comcare,158 a psychiatrist had given evidence in
which he said, in very strong terms, that the applicant was not
depressed, but that if he had been, he should have been on a much
higher dose of antidepressant medication than he was.' 59 He described
the current dose of 450 milligrams a day as "minute" and "only
homoeopathic" and said that Mr. O'Maley should have been taking ten
or twelve 150 milligrams tablets a day; a daily dose of 1500 milligrams
or 1800 milligrams. 60 He added, "Because the makers say that they are
of no use unless one takes three in a small person and four in a medium
size person, that is the sort of background that the makers in their - the
manufacturers have in their guide, under that they have no use." 161
150. Id. at paras. 40-42.
151. (1990) No. D88/3 A.A.T. No. 5974, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrep4i77.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
152. Id. at para. 59.
153. Id
154. (1991) No. P88/573 A.A.T. No. 6757, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep426 1.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
155. Id. at para. 2.
156. Id. at para. 3.
157. Id. at para. 4.
158. (1997) No. V96/7 A.A.T. No. 11593, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep6562.html (last visited Sep. 5, 2002).
159. Id. at para. 79.
160. Id. at paras. 82, 83.
161. Id. at para. 83.
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Of the other three psychiatrists who gave evidence, two considered
450 milligrams per day an appropriate dose and one said he might
consider increasing it but only up to 900 milligrams a day. 16 2 As I was
drafting the reasons for decision, it appeared to me that the discrepancy
was so great as to cast doubt on the credibility of the psychiatrist who
recommended the greatly increased dose. I therefore checked the
recommended prescribed dose in the American Mims Manual and found
that it did not say what he had represented it as saying.'63 It
recommended a starting dose of 300 milligrams a day which could be
increased "to 450 milligrams a day and up to 600 milligrams a day if
necessary."' 64 I arranged for a copy of that extract to be sent to the
parties and invited them to make submissions on the issue. 165 The party
calling that psychiatrist did not argue that his evidence on that issue
should be accepted. 166 That decision is further considered in the section
of this paper which deals with the role of expert witnesses and
recommendations for changes in procedures used by tribunals and
courts.
Usually the Tribunal will not procure material put before the parties,
but rather suggest to the parties evidence which would assist it in
reaching the correct and preferable decision.167 In Stephan v. Secretary
to the Department of Social Security,168 I pointed out that I did not have
sufficient medical evidence to decide the matter. 169 I asked the applicant
to provide further medical reports. He did so and based upon that
material, the respondent, having declined the option of reconvening the
Tribunal, a decision was made that Mr. Stephan was entitled to invalid
pension. 70 In Mourtitzikoglou v. Secretary to the Department of Social
Security, 171 I asked the Secretary to obtain a social work report as to the
circumstances in which the applicant and her family were living, so that
I could take that into account in deciding whether there were special
circumstances such that some part of a lump sum payment of
162. Id. at para. 84.
163. Id. at para. 85.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at para. 87.
167. See Stephen v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Soc. Sec. (1985) 9 A.L.N. at para. 37, available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/unrep2129.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
168. Id
169. Id. at para. 37.
170. Id. at paras. 34-35.
171. (1991) 22 A.L.D. 667, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/aulcases/
cth/aat/unrep4l99.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
compensation should be treated as if it had not been paid. 72 That would
then allow the applicant to receive invalid pension, notwithstanding her
receipt of that compensation.173 After the report was obtained, the
Secretary conceded that special circumstances existed so as to justify
him disregarding the whole payment of compensation which had been
made. 17 4
An interventionist approach proved unsuccessful in LNC (Wholesale)
Pty. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs.17 5  The matter was remitted by the
Federal Court on the ground that the statements of agreed facts and the
written and oral evidence presented to the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal were inadequate to enable the Tribunal to form a concluded
view on the issues.176 Before the remittal hearing, Deputy President
Bannon directed the respondent to provide further and better particulars
as to the issue of homologation.'77 However, in spite of that direction
Counsel for both parties informed the Tribunal that they did not propose
to adduce further evidence. 178 Deputy President Bannon pointing out
that he could take the matter no further said:
While [section] 33(1)(c) of the A.A.T Act provides
that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence,
but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it
thinks appropriate, the Tribunal is also obliged to act
judicially. There is no available fund for the Tribunal to
embark on inquisitorial proceedings outside the hearing
room, and no power to take evidence on commission
abroad as provided for example in the Evidence by
Commission Act, 1885 (Imp.) in the case of courts. It
appears to me that I have exhausted the possibilities of
obtaining further evidence in these proceedings. 179
The Deputy President then proceeded to decide the matter on the
basis explained by the Federal Court in McDonald v. Director-General
of Social Security,18 ° but added:
172. Id. at paras. 15-17.
173. Id. at paras. 6, 8-9.
174. Id. at paras. 11-13, 18-20.
175. (1988) Nos. N86/416, 422, 721, 912 A.A.T. No. 4814, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/unrep3560.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
176. Id. at para. 2.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at para. 5.
180. (1984) 6 A.L.D. 6, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrep1 530.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
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It is perhaps proper that I add that consideration may
have to be given to expanding the Tribunal's powers to
enable it to conduct inquisitorial proceedings and take
evidence from foreign exporters, if necessary abroad, in
order to arrive at the truth in customs matters. It is not
satisfactory that important fiscal matters be determined
on the basis of insufficient evidence. I share, with
respect, the concern of the Court as to the evidence
available to me. It is a matter for Parliament to
determine if this Tribunal should be granted the financial
resources and the legal powers to conduct a more
adequate review process.' 8 '
Of course there has been no subsequent amendment to widen our
powers, and no budget increase to allow us to conduct inquisitorial
proceedings if necessary abroad. In my opinion we already have the
power but we lack the means, unless the inquisitorial steps can be
undertaken without significant expense.
I struck difficulties with our limited resources in Kiazim v.
Commonwealth.8 2  I was reviewing a compensation "cease effects"
determination.8 3 The evidence was very unsatisfactory as to what, if
anything, was wrong with Mr. Kiazim, as to whether he had reported the
condition at work, and as to the progress of his rehabilitation at
Coonac. is4 I arranged for the Telecom and Coonac files to be put before
the Tribunal.' 85 My associate then looked through the files and drew to
my attention any relevant medical records. 8 6 The files contained
material suggesting that the true reason for Mr. Kiazim's absences from
work may have been because of a conflict with his supervisors over his
unsatisfactory work record. 87 In addition, one file contained two records
of information which suggested that Mr. Kiazim was not incapacitated
for work at all but was working in a fish and chip shop.' Although the
files had been made available to the parties and they had been asked to
181. LNC (Wholesale) Pty. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1988) Nos. N86/416, 422,
721, 912 A.A.T. No. 4814, at para. 12, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrep3560.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
182. (1986) 9 A.L.N., available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/
cth/aat/unrep2356.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
183. Id
184. Id.
185. Id. at para. 22.
186. Id
187. Id. at para. 26.
188. Id.
make submissions concerning the material in them, they did not address
the issue of incapacity in their submissions.' 89 What was I to do? I
delivered an interim decision in which I said:
Some of these matters give rise to possible
inferences against Mr. Kiazim. On the other hand, the
matters set out in the files have not been tested in a
hearing. They may be statements made in error or there
may be further information which casts a different light
on these matters. I do not know whether they have been
noticed by those who have inspected the files on behalf
of the parties. I have received no submissions in respect
of these matters.
The evidence before the Tribunal is in a state where
it is unsatisfactory either to rely on it or to disregard it
altogether. The only approach open to the Tribunal
seems to be to bring the matters to the attention of the
parties. In this way they can either produce further
evidence or make submissions on the material which is
presently before the Tribunal. I propose to make the
files available to the parties again and to give both
parties thirty days within which to apply to have the
matter brought on for further hearing or to make written
submissions on the matters referred to in this interim
decision.' 90
The matter was revisited in a later hearing. There was evidence as to
Mr. Kiazim's poor work performance, but he was not cross-examined as
to whether he had been working in the fish and chip shop on other than
an occasional basis. The person who was shown in the files as having
reported that he worked in the fish and chip shop was not called. I
found that if Mr. Kiazim was incapacitated for work, it was not due to a
compensable condition, but it seemed unsatisfactory that the parties did
not treat as significant the issue whether or not he was incapacitated for
work. I certainly could not call and cross-examine witnesses on that
issue myself.
There are sometimes situations where the Tribunal refers to
inadequacies in the evidence, but decides not to seek to remedy those
189. Id. at para. 27.
190. Id. at paras. 27-30.
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inadequacies. In AAT Case 5756,1' the Tribunal had to determine the
significance of amendments to a trust deed. There were problems with
the evidence. Deputy President Bannon said:
The family trust became the subject of a number of
manoeuvres. The grey eminence behind those
manoeuvres was the local accountant, a gentleman well
known to those dealing with taxation matters. He was
present at the hearing of this matter on the first two days.
Neither the taxpayer nor the respondent called him as a
witness. However, criticism was made of his non-
appearance in the witness box. When the tribunal
suggested at the close of their evidence that it might
exercise its inquisitorial powers and call him as a
witness, neither party desired this to be done. The grey
eminence shortly thereafter left the hearing room and did
not appear against that day nor the next. No inference
will be drawn because of his arrival or departure.
Having regard to the statutory onus of proof in taxation
matters, and the competent and skilled representation of
both parties in these proceedings, I consider it
inexpedient to summons the accountant to give evidence
when not called by either party. 192
In Riley v. Comcare Australia,'93 the Tribunal considered that the
evidence was inadequate as to what was "suitable employment" for the
applicant.'94 The Tribunal considered whether it should rely on its own
experience as to what types of employment would be suitable for her.195
It decided against that course, partly because of the difficulty of
formulating that experience in a way in which it could be put before the
parties as required by § 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act
of 1975.196 Secondly, it appreciated that it would be better served by an
assessment prepared by those with appropriate skills. The Tribunal then
looked at § 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act to consider
whether it gave the Tribunal power to order Mrs. Riley to undergo the
appropriate assessment. 197 It concluded:
191. (1990) 21 A.T.R. 3281.
192. Id. at 3882.
193. (1994) A.A.T. 8078B, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep6627.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
194. Id. at para. 14.
195. Id. at para. 20.
196. Id
197. Id.
In this regard, we have considered section 33 of the AAT
Act and, in particular, paragraph 33(l)(c) which
provides:
"(1) In a proceeding before the Tribunal:
(c) the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence
but may inform itself on any matter in such manner
as it thinks appropriate."
Paragraph 33(l)(c) sets out a very broad power but
we do not regard it as justifying our making an order
requiring Mrs. Riley to be assessed. While the provision
that the Tribunal "may inform itself on any matter in
such manner as it thinks appropriate" could perhaps be
interpreted as justifying such an order, we consider that
these words must be construed in light of the preceding
provision that the Tribunal "is not bound by the rules of
evidence". When that is done, we consider that
paragraph 33(1)(c) means that the Tribunal may have
regard to such evidence as it thinks fit without being
bound by the rules of evidence in doing so but no more.
It does not justify its use of investigative powers. To
explain what we mean, we should explain what we mean
by rules of evidence and investigative powers.
198
The Tribunal then considered whether under § 43 of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act the matter should be remitted to
Comcare with the direction that it make arrangements that the necessary
assessment be performed to determine what work would be "suitable
employment" for Mrs. Riley. 19 9 The Tribunal decided not to do so,
although it acknowledged that the conclusion did not accord "with either
commonsense or with the function given to Comcare. 2 °°
I regard the Tribunal's interpretation of § 33(1)(c) of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act as unduly restrictive. That is not
to say that I would necessarily have directed Mrs. Riley to undergo the
appropriate assessment. I might have tried to persuade the parties to
arrange for it to be performed.
Perhaps the most unusual investigation suggested by the Tribunal in
my experience took place in Hanns v. Australian Postal Corporation.
20 1
The question was whether Mr. Hanns continued to be incapacitated for
198. Id. at paras. 22-23 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at para. 34.
200. Id. at para. 33.
201. (1992) A.A.T. 7869.
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work as a result of a compensable shoulder injury and resulting
depression. 20 2 The respondent contended that Mr. Hanns no longer had
any problem with his shoulder and was malingering." 3  Four
psychiatrists were to be called on that issue. The evidence included a
report from an orthopaedic surgeon who had examined Mr. Hanns and
reported that he had found signs of impingement and tenderness of the
shoulder. 2 4 The orthopaedic surgeon had suggested in his report that he
perform an arthroscopy to determine the state of the shoulder. He said
that during that procedure he would correct any internal derangements
or pathology which was found. When the hearing commenced the
arthroscopy had not been performed.20 5 We said in our reasons for
decision:
As at the date of the commencement of the hearing
on 12 December 1990 that arthroscopy had not taken
place. Mr. Hanns in evidence said this was because he
could not arrange to have the surgical procedure unless it
was paid for by Australia Post. He had apparently not
investigated the possibility of having the surgery
performed under Medicare.
At the conclusion of the three day hearing in
December 1990 the Tribunal had heard evidence from
three psychiatrists and a number of Australia Post
employees as well as Mr. Hanns, Dr. Roantree and Dr.
Bokor. There seemed to be considerable conflict
amongst the psychiatrists. The Tribunal therefore raised
with Counsel the possibility of having the arthroscopy
and any appropriate surgery performed, so that the
Tribunal would be in a position where it knew whether
or not there was an organic explanation of the shoulder
pain of which Mr. Hanns complained. This suggestion
was accepted by both parties and the arthroscopy took
place on 6 February 1991.206
The hearing resumed six months after the arthroscopy. At that time
the Tribunal had before it a report from the surgeon who had performed
the arthroscopy, stating:
I reviewed Michael today and it is about 4.5 months
202. Id
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id.
Fair Play the lnouisitorial Way
since his arthroscopic shoulder debridement and
coracoacromial ligament resection. Overall he is
delighted with his outcome and states that his pain has
decreased about 90% compared to his pre-operative
status. He still gets occasional twinges of discomfort
with particular movements but he has been gradually
doing more and more activities without any great
discomfort. He has, however, not tested his shoulder to
extremes with regard to heavy work.
Clinical examination today shows only minimal
local tendinitis and equivocal impingement signs. His
strength is reasonable. There is a full, good range of
motion.
While currently he is substantially improved I feel he
should be cautious in returning to any heavy work and
would rather that he gradually resume activities in a light
duties capacity for the next 2-4 months and then re-
introduce more significant activities.
207
The Tribunal found that report very helpful and concluded that Mr.
Hanns remained incapacitated for work until after he recovered from the
surgery.2 °8
(b) Assistance to and Questioning of Unrepresented Applicants
Both courts and tribunals these days recognize their duty to assist
unrepresented applicants by explaining to them the issues as to which
they will need to call evidence and the procedures at the hearing. In
Titan v. Babic,20 9  the question was whether the Master of Supreme
Court of the Australian Capital Territory should have allowed Mr. Titan
an adjournment so that he could call witnesses in support of his claim
for loss of earnings. 210 The Full Court of the Federal Court said:
The question remains whether the master should
have allowed Mr. Titan an adjournment to call
witnesses. Where it is apparent that a party who does
not have legal representation has misunderstood
procedural requirements so that he or she is not in a
position to complete the presentation of evidence, an
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. (1994) 126 A.L.R.455, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/federal%5fct/unrep68 11.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
210. Id. at para. 21.
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adjournment might be considered in the interests ofjustice provided that no irreparable substantive or
procedural injustice is done to the other party involved.
In any such case the granting of an adjournment will be a
matter of discretion. In this case there was no
application for an adjournment nor does there seem to
have been any intelligible explanation to the Master of
Mr. Titan's failure to arrange his witnesses. It may be
that in some cases a tribunal should, to avoid possible
injustice, inquire of an unrepresented person the reason
for the failure properly to prepare his or her case. Again,
that is a matter of discretion limited by the necessity that
the tribunal be, and appear to be, impartial as between
the parties.211
There was no guidance given as to the precise circumstances when
those discretions should be exercised to assist an unrepresented
applicant.
In Ball v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 1 2 Justice Lindgren held
that there was no obligation on the Tribunal to offer Mr. Ball an
adjournment because his solicitor was not present at the hearing. 213 He
additionally held that the Tribunal had taken adequate steps to assist Mr.
Ball by explaining to him the relevant issues and the importance of
tendering any documentary evidence on which he relied.214
On a number of occasions it has been claimed by an individual party
on appeal that the Tribunal's questioning of the party or of his or her
witnesses has been so searching as to deny procedural fairness. On the
whole such appeals have not been successful. In Perring v. Australian
Postal Corp,215 Justice Einfeld expressed the view that the Tribunal's
questioning should not have occurred, but found that it was not such as
to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias.216 He said in words similar
to those he used in Repatriation Commission v. Levi:217
Although s.33(l)(c) of the AAT Act permits the tribunal
to ignore the rules of evidence and procedure and inform
itself of any matters in any way it thinks appropriate, the
211. Id.
212. (1966) 33 A.T.R. 226.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. (1993) 31 A.L.D. 693, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/federal%5fct/unrep6247.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
216. Id. at para. 3.
217. (1994) 33 A.L.D. 79.
section does not envisage the tribunal calling the
evidence itself or taking over the conduct of cases. It
must always respect the rights of the parties and the
perceptions of others about the system. It ought also to
pause long before substituting itself as the actual or
possible adversary especially where both parties are
represented by apparently competent legal practitioners.
Here there were two professional barristers. The
questioning under criticism in this case exceeded those
simple time-tested rules and should not have occurred.218
He concluded:
On this basis, although the interrogation of Mr.
Perring by the tribunal should not be countenanced or
supported in any way, I have concluded on balance that
what reasonably flows from the tribunal's questioning
concerned [sic] was an unwisely executed but
understandable effort to discover the motivations of the
applicant and a truthful explanation of the complex web
of events it was being asked to decide. The evidence
was to all intents and purposes complete when the
questioning took place. It is not unlikely that the tribunal
held some tentative views about the case but I doubt that
anyone could reasonably have apprehended bias against
the applicant's claim.2
19
More recently in Murphy v. Australian Postal Corporation,220 Justice
Finn was prepared to give more emphasis than Justice Einfeld had done
to the Tribunal's responsibility for finding the relevant facts. He said:
It is the case that the Tribunal is bound to observe
the rules of procedural fairness and to that end it should
be guided where relevant by the rule in Browne v. Dunn.
It equally is the case that the Tribunal is not bound by
the rules of evidence and may inform itself on any
matter in such manner as it thinks fit. One method of
informing itself can entail undertaking examination of a
witness. Where this occurs issues of procedural fairness
can arise.
218. Perring v. Australian Postal Corp. (1993) 31 A.L.D 693, at para. 43, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pllau/cases/cth/federal%5fct/unrep6247.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
219. Id. at para. 45.
220. (1994) 503 F.C.R. 95, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/federal%5fct/unrep7633.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
SDrin 2002 Fair Play the Inquisitorial Way
118 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 22-1
There clearly can be circumstances in which
procedural fairness would require the Tribunal to put a
witness on notice as to the inferences it could draw from
questions asked, especially where the burden of the
questions is not self evident . . . The present case,
however, is not one in which the Tribunal members can
be faulted on the manner of their questioning of the
applicant and of the medical witnesses and of their use
of the answers given. With the medical history, the
applicant's capabilities and more broadly his credibility
being all clearly in question, there could be no issue of
prejudice or surprise in the use made by the Tribunal
members of the answers given to their questions.2 2 1
In the recent criminal deportation matter of Hordila v. Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs,222 the Tribunal not only arranged
for the applicant's psychiatrist to prepare a report and give evidence, it
also took great care to ensure that the applicant understood what was
happening in the proceedings:
The Tribunal had earlier arranged for the presiding
member's associate to attend with an interpreter at the
Lodden Prison for the purpose of explaining the contents
of "T" documents to the applicant. Other documents
referred to (including statements from the two detectives
and the respondent's outline of argument) were
interpreted during the adjournments, given for that
purpose, in the course of the hearing.223
Frequently in conferences, directions hearings or even regrettably at
the final hearing of a matter, unrepresented applicants have no idea what
material he or she needs to present to the Tribunal, or how to address the
issues raised by the respondent. Reductions in legal aid have made this
problem more common. In such circumstances, I have arranged for the
District Registrar to send detailed letters to an applicant (with a copy to
the respondent). These letters explain what steps the applicant must take
either to prepare for the hearing, or if the hearing has already
commenced, to introduce appropriate evidence before the Tribunal.
In Bartlett v. Comcare,224 an applicant attempted to show that her
221. Id. at paras. 18, 22 (citations omitted).
222. No. V96/1192, A.A.T. LEXIS No. 11695 slip op. (May 13, 1997).
223. Id. at para. 2.
224. (1996) 40 A.L.D. 709, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
psychiatric condition was related to her employment.225 She did not
appear to fully understand the importance of producing medical
evidence regarding her state of health during the relevant period.226 I
arranged for the Registrar to send a detailed letter to both parties
advising precisely what medical evidence Miss Bartlett should agree to
place before the Tribunal. 227 The respondent assisted the Tribunal by
writing to the relevant doctors once Miss Bartlett had provided authority
for the respondent to do so. 22 8  Even with these reports, there was
insufficient evidence for Miss Bartlett to succeed.229  The Tribunal
therefore affirmed the decision under review, but at least, Miss Bartlett
knew her case had been fully investigated.2 3 Neither the respondent nor
the Tribunal had allowed her inadequate understanding of the hearing
requirements to disadvantage her.231  The letter sent to the parties in
Bartlett is set out in full in the Reasons for Decision in order to give
some indication as to the steps the Tribunal may consider appropriate
when an applicant is unrepresented.232
I adopted a similar procedure in Galea v. Secretary, Department of
Social Security.233 That matter concerned the deposit of money by Mrs.
Galea on trust for her adult children.234 The issue before the Tribunal
was whether she had disposed of assets in the relevant period.235 In
order to answer that question, I needed to determine whether the money
in the bank accounts was her money or her children's money. 36 Once
again, the Tribunal sent a letter to Mrs. Galea laying out the reasons for
decision.237 Mrs. Galea did not reply, so the Tribunal decided the matter
on the evidence given at the hearing.
My intention in setting out the full text of the letters in decisions
such as Bartlett and Galea was to clarify to parties, practitioners,
cases/cth/aat/unrep6078.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
225. Id. at para. 1.
226. Id. at para. 30.
227. Id. at para. 31.
228. Id.
229. Id. at para. 33.
230. Id. at para. 53.
231. Id. at para. 54.
232. Id. at para. 30.
233. (1994) 34 A.L.D 673, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep546 l.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
234. Id. at para. 1.
235. Id. at para. 5.
236. Id. at para. 9.
237. Id. at para. 47.
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academics and the Federal Court the steps the Tribunal has taken in the
matter, so that it will be apparent that we have moved towards an
inquisitorial approach.
(iv) The Role of Expert Witnesses in Providing Assistance to the
Tribunal in Reaching a Correct and Preferable Decision
The way in which expert witnesses are used in the adversarial system
is very different from the approach adopted by the inquisitorial system.
As stated earlier, in an adversarial system, a party may go from expert to
expert seeking a favourable witness and is usually under no obligation to
disclose the report of an unfavourable expert.
In an inquisitorial system, the court chooses the expert, who gives the
court the benefit of his or her expert opinion. Professor Langbein
described the distinction:
German courts obtain expert help in lawsuits the way
Americans obtain expert help in business or personal
affairs. If you need an architect, a dermatologist, or a
plumber, you do not commission a pair of them to take
pre-ordained and opposing positions on your problem,
although you do sometimes take a second opinion.
Rather, you take care to find an expert who is qualified
to advise you in an objective manner; you probe his
advice as best you can; and if you find his advice
persuasive, you follow it.238
My experience suggests that the use of expert witnesses in the
adversarial system has three significant drawbacks:
(a) the "experts" who are called are often not the best qualified
to help;
(b) they are frequently confused as to whether their primary role
is to assist the AAT, or to assist the party who is paying
them; and
(c) sometimes efforts are made to inhibit the AAT from
becoming aware of relevant evidence obtained by one party,
which would assist the other party.
I will briefly touch on my experience with each of these problems.
238. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 837 (1985).
(a) Do We Get the Most Qualified Expert Witnesses?
This problem arises in two ways. Sometimes a medical expert in the
relevant discipline refuses to given an opinion in a medical/legal matter
because he or she does not want to be subjected to adversarial cross-
examination, designed to confuse rather than to clarify the issues.
Sometimes, even a treating specialist is unwilling to attend a hearing.
The applicant or his/her solicitor may be unwilling to risk issuing a
summons for fear of upsetting the doctor and disturbing the
doctor/patient relationship. Quite often, in the pressure of litigation, the
treating general practitioner is overlooked in favor of "impressive"
specialists, when in fact the treating doctor's history is an important fact
to take into account in conjunction with the specialist's opinion. My
opinion, expressed a number of times, is that treating general
practitioners and specialists are important medical witnesses, and
frequently assist the Tribunal more than "medical/legal experts."
The point was first made in 1982 in Leone v. Director-General of
Social Services,239 where Mr. Hall, then Senior Member, expressed the
view that often the evidence of the general practitioner who has treated
the patient over a period of time, and not simply for the purposes of
legal proceedings, can be considerably valuable. In Stephan v.
Secretary, Department of Social Security,240 we endorsed that view and
added our belief that the evidence of treating orthopaedic surgeons is
often of more assistance than the evidence of doctors who only see the
applicants for the purpose of giving evidence at a hearing.
In Callanan v. Australian Postal Corporation,41 I had to decide
whether an angioplasty had been reasonable medical treatment for an
ulcer that had been present for some months without healing. Although
both sides offered evidence presented by medical specialists, including
evidence from the treating vascular surgeon, neither side called the
treating general practitioner nor tendered his notes in evidence, even
though I was told he or she was present at the hearing. Because one
issue was the size and pattern of healing of the ulcer, I believed that the
notes might have been relevant. After the hearing, I arranged for the
District Registrar to write to the parties telling them I considered those
notes helpful in making my decision. Neither party objected, although
the respondent sought to reconvene the hearing so that respondent could
239. (1982) 4 A.L.N. N104.
240. (1985) 9 A.L.N., available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/
unrep2l29.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
241. (1999) A.A.T. 978.
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cross-examine the doctor. We reconvened the meeting, and I found the
notes helpful in informing me of the state of the applicant's ulcer before
and after the angioplasty was performed. I called for the treating
doctor's notes in an earlier decision and found them to be relevant.242
(b) Partisan Expert Witnesses
In my 1991 article Overcoming the Adversarial Bias in Tribunal
Procedures,243 I stated that the need to discourage the parties' use of
partisan expert witnesses had been a concern of the AAT for many
years, but that we were seeing parties turn to more balanced and
impartial experts, or even in rare cases, to a mutually acceptable expert.
Unfortunately, today, a significant problem remains.
The trouble with adversarial expert witnesses is that their evidence is
not as helpful as their expertise would lead one to expect, because they
do not give their best expert opinion. They "argue cases," and one has
the impression that they sometimes advance views that are more
governed by "partisan" considerations than by an expert appraisal of the
facts.
These problems are certainly not confined to the AAT. The High
Court raised these issues in Vakauta v. Kelly,2" where the trial judge
(with more frankness than commonsense) had referred to the
respondent's medical witnesses as "that unholy trinity," and the "usual
panel of doctors who think you can do a full week's work without any
arms or legs. 245
The difficulties with partisan expert witnesses have been a factor in
the recent changes in the Supreme Court of Western Australia's pre-trial
case management practice. The considerations leading to those changes
have been discussed by Justice Ipp in his articles Reforms to the
Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation.246 Perhaps the most interesting
change in this regard is the requirement that expert witnesses meet
before giving evidence to see if they can reach a common ground. It is
my view that there would be a place for a similar requirement before the
242. See Porter v. Comcare (1995) A.A.T. 10071.
243. See Dwyer, supra note 6.
244. (1989) 167 C.L.R. 568, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cthihigh%5fct/167clr568.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
245. Id at para. 6.
246. 'pp D.A., Reforms to the Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation -Part I, 69 AuSTL.
L.J. 705 (1996); Ipp D.A., Reforms to the Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation - Part II,
69 AusTL. L.J. 790 (1995).
AAT, but on the only occasion where I made the suggestion, I was told
that the medical experts in question would not agree to the proposal.
An area where the use of expert witnesses has been identified as
causing difficulty for the AAT is in determining whether or not a disease
or injury is attributable to military service under the Veterans'
Entitlements Act of 1986.247
The problems are exacerbated in matters where the test laid down by
the legislation is that of a "reasonable hypothesis." Expert witnesses
advance hypotheses more readily than opinion. It can be difficult for the
Tribunal to determine whether such a hypothesis is "reasonable" as
advanced by a "respectable medical practitioner," "eminent in the
relevant field of knowledge," or is some speculative proposition that the
expert would not advance in front of a group of colleagues.
In Gillman v. Repatriation Commission,248 I explained the problem,
and even quoted principles for the guidance of expert witnesses laid
down by the court in National Justice Companies Naviera SA v.
Prudential Assurance Co. (the "Ikarian Reefer ).249
The problems are also significant in compensation matters. In Beer v.
Australian Telecommunications Commission,250 Deputy President Todd
stated with respect to a diagnosis of repetitive strain injury:
As to this there is not only no unanimity amongst the
medical profession, there is instead quite bitter division,
with polarised attitudes and sometimes express or
implied condemnation of those who hold other views.
Some of the evidence can be disquieting and bordering
on the demeaning. I have to say that the least toleration
of opposing or alternative views tends to come from
some of those at the pole which represents the view that
unless a well-recognised disease entity, such as one of
those referred to above, can be diagnosed, or a specific
lesion in the medical sense identified, the claimant's
allegations of pain must be rejected and the claimant
inferentially dismissed as a "malingerer. 251
In Flynn v. Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp.,
252
247. Veterans' Entitlements Act, 1986 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/legis/cth/consol act/veal986261/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
248. (1993) 30 A.L.D. 545, 555-56.
249. Nat'l Justice Compania Navier S.A. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd., 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 68 (Q.B. 1993) ("Ikarian Reefer") affd, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 455 (Eng. C.A. 1995).
250. (1990) A.A.T. 5974, para. 56.
251. Id
252. (1990) 92 A.A.T. 8656, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
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the Tribunal expressed its opinion of all the evidence except evidence by
one of the psychiatrists who testified:
The difficulty which we have encountered arises not
only from the fact that the views of the expert witnesses
are so different from one another but also from the fact
that, apart from Dr. Cole, we did not find any of the
experts to be a satisfactory witness. Dr. Kingston, Dr.
Freed and Dr. Wahr all gave evidence strictly in
conformity with their written reports and displayed a
total reluctance to consider the possible merits of any
opinion other than that which each had himself
expressed originally.
Dr. Wahr referred to his examination of "thousands
of plaintiffs". It was clear that he had examined them on
behalf of defendants; the dismissive manner in which he
described what they had told him created an impression
of prejudice and that he regarded the applicant as one
more plaintiff to be disbelieved. Alone of all the
psychiatrists he considered that the applicant had no
incapacity for work. He appeared to us to have closed
his mind totally to any possible view of the applicant's
condition and its cause other than the one he had formed
as a result of his single examination of the applicant.
Dr. Freed went to great lengths to explain the
reasons why he held his own views about the applicant
and her condition but, although he acknowledged that
Dr. Cole was a psychiatrist of good repute, he refused
completely to consider the opinions which he had
expressed. He refused to say why he disagreed with
them, saying instead that he was never willing to
criticize the opinions of another well qualified medical
practitioner. In taking that attitude, he clearly indicated
a failure to understand the role of an expert witness, that
is to say that he is required not only to state his own
opinions and the reasons for them but also, where they
conflict with the opinions of other experts, to explain
why his opinions should be preferred to them. 253
The Tribunal again referred to problems with the expert evidence in
cases/cth/aat/unrep4996.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
253. Id. at paras. 31, 33-34.
Falzon v. Comcare. 254 We said:
We have recently read Chapter 13 of the "Access to
Justice: Final Report" by the Right Honourable the Lord
Woolf, Master of the Rolls. Chapter 13 of that report
deals with "Expert Evidence". Lord Woolf has
addressed the question of impartiality of experts and has
written:
The present system has the effect of
exaggerating the adversarial role of experts, and
this helps neither the court nor the parties. As
the Court of Appeal has recently remarked:
"For whatever reason, and whether
consciously or unconsciously, the fact is
that expert witnesses instructed on
behalf of parties to litigation often
tend... to espouse the cause of those
instructing them to a greater or lesser
extent, on occasion becoming more
partisan than the parties."
The clear implication of this is that a new
approach is required which emphasises experts'
impartiality. In cases where the option of a
single expert is not pursued, it is particularly
important that each opposing expert's
overriding duty to the court is clearly
understood. This is partly a matter of good
practice on the part of instructing solicitors, who
may themselves need guidance as to the
appropriate form of instructions to experts. In
my view, clarification in the rules of court is
also needed.
Contributions to the Inquiry from experts
themselves suggest that there is a degree of
uncertainty among them as to their duties, and a
perceived conflict between their professional
responsibilities and the demands of the client
who is paying their fee. Experts would
welcome some formal recognition of their role
as advisers to the court rather than advocates of
254. (1997) A.A.T. 11628, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/aat/unrep6588.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
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the parties.
Although we accept that all the medical witnesses
who gave evidence intended to be fair and impartial, we
pointed out to Mr. Weaver and Ms. Schellenberger that
their reports and evidence did demonstrate some
confusion as to their role. They are called as expert
medical witnesses and their assistance to the Tribunal
depends on their maintaining a medical focus unaffected
by their perception of the exigencies of the litigation in
which they are called. The language used by both Mr.
Weaver and Ms. Schellenberger in their lengthy reports
at times, in our view, demonstrated concern with legal
issues rather than with purely medical matters. Mr.
Weaver set out the history obtained from Mr. Falzon in
terms of allegations and concessions. Ms.
Schellenberger's report used the terminology of claims
and denials ....
Ms. Schellenberger, within eight lines in a passage in
her report, mentioned three times that Mr. Falzon and his
wife had been supported by compensation payments
from Comcare for the last six years. That seems to have
been giving undue emphasis to a matter which was not
relevant to medical issues. 255
As is apparent from the reference to Lord Woolf s report in the U.K.,
the problem is recognized by lawyers and doctors both in Australia and
the United Kingdom, and no doubt wherever there is an adversarial
system of justice. A tremendous amount of time and money is wasted if
we obtain polarised reports from medical experts at both ends of the
spectrum.256
It is a great challenge to tribunals and courts to devise procedures
which will result in them obtaining expert witnesses who recognize their
duty to give impartial expert opinions. The Supreme Court of Western
Australia has been extremely innovative in this respect. It remains to be
seen how far Lord Woolf s recommendations will be followed by the
new Blair government in England. At least the problem has been
identified and the means of remedying it have been suggested.
255. Id. at paras. 60-62 (citations omitted).
256. See e.g., Vernon v. Bosley, 1 All E.R. 577 (Q.B. 1997); Vernon v. Bosley (No. 2), 1
All E.R. 614 (Eng. C.A. 1997). See also Joan L. Dwyer, The Vernon Saga, TORTS LAW
REVIEw (forthcoming).
(d) The Failure to Disclose Relevant Expert Evidence
In Roche v. Commonwealth of Australia,257 the Tribunal decided not
to call a psychiatrist who had examined the applicant on behalf of the
respondent.258 The Tribunal explained:
The applicant's counsel was critical of the respondent
for not calling Dr. Saboisky, a psychiatrist. That he had
made a report or reports was known. The respondent did
not call Dr. Saboisky. The applicant did not call him.
The Tribunal did not call for his report. In many areas of
the Tribunal's work, it would be proper for the Tribunal
to adopt a somewhat interventionist role. In particular, if
an applicant is unrepresented, the Tribunal sometimes
has to adopt to some degree an inquisitorial role. But in
compensation cases in which counsel are involved on
both sides, there would be real dangers in the Tribunal so
conducting itself.259
The Tribunal did not consider whether perhaps it was only a matter of
expense which was stopping the applicant from calling Dr. Saboisky.
Nobody ever discovered whether or not his or her evidence would have
been helpful to the applicant. A better course for the Tribunal to have
adopted might have been that outlined in McMaugh v. Australian
Telecommunications Commission,260 where the Tribunal suggested that
it would use section 37(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act
1975 in similar circumstances.26'
I had a similar experience recently. At the commencement of a
hearing, counsel for the applicant raised with the Tribunal his client's
concern that the respondent refused to make available to him a copy of
the report of the medico-legal orthopaedic surgeon to whom he had
presented himself at the respondent's request.
I expressed surprise at the respondent's attitude particularly in view
of the responsibility of a compensation authority to pay compensation to
those who have the necessary entitlement, but the respondent's counsel
was not influenced by my views. I then suggested that perhaps I might
257. (1988) 16 A.L.D. 787, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/
unrep3567.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
258. Id. at para. 19.
259. Id.
260. (1991) 22 A.L.D. 393, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/
unrep4212.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
261. Id. at para. 1.
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require production of the report bearing in mind the comments of Justice
Brennan in Bushell v. Repatriation Commission as to the inquisitorial
nature of proceedings before the Tribunal.262 Counsel for the respondent
expressed outrage at this suggestion and relied on legal professional
privilege as his justification.
I referred the parties to McMaugh v. Australian Telecommunications
Commission.2 63 As McMaugh explains, the answer lies in the powers
under sections 37(2) and 37(3) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Act which provide:
[37](2) Where the Tribunal is of the opinion that
particular documents or that other documents included in
a particular class of documents may be relevant to the
review of the decision by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may
cause to be served on the person a notice in writing
stating that the Tribunal is of the opinion and requiring
the person to lodge with the Tribunal, within a time
specified in the notice, the prescribed number of copies
of each of those other documents that is in the
possession or under his control, and a person on whom
such a notice is served shall comply with this notice.
[37](3) This section has effect notwithstanding any
rule of law relating to privilege or the public interest in
relation to the production or documents.21
When I drew the attention of counsel to sections 37(2) and 37(3), the
matter settled before I had the opportunity to make a formal direction in
writing under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act.
The reverse situation arises where the Tribunal is prepared under
sections 40(l A) and (I B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act of
1975 to summons treating doctors to produce their files at a directions
hearing prior to a full hearing, so that the respondent may obtain a full
medical history. Of course that procedure is only appropriate in respect
of treating notes relevant to the condition at issue in the proceedings.
The applicant, or his or her solicitor, is always advised of the directions
hearing and is at liberty to object to a copy being given if the material is
not relevant to the issues in dispute. The use of this procedure is
constantly being monitored because of concerns that respondents may
be using the summons procedure in a manner oppressive to applicants,
262. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 408, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/highct/
175clr408.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
263. McMaugh, 22 A.L.D. 393.
264. Id. at para. 19.
rather than simply to obtain relevant medical information.
4. How CAN TRIBUNAL MEMBERS BE HELPED TO ADAPT TO THEIR
CHANGING ROLES?
(i) Education and Training
When I published my paper in 1991, the AAT seemed well respected.
I was intending to gently persuade AAT members, as well as applicants
and respondents before the Tribunal, that it was appropriate for the
Tribunal to use its inquisitorial powers to a much greater extent than it
had been doing. I was not intending to criticize the AAT for being
unduly adversarial, as the accepted culture in legal circles seemed to be
that the adversarial method was the preferred method in Australia and
Britain. In the words of Justice Mahoney in Government Insurance
Office of New South Wales v. Glascock,265 that was "the expectation of
the parties. 266
In the 1990's, the climate seems to have changed to one of criticism
of the AAT for "excessive formality" and "excessive legalism," neither
of which criticisms I consider to be justified. The criticism of
"excessive adversarialism" is quite often also levelled at the AAT. I
often suspect those making that criticism have very little appreciation of
what would be involved in reducing the degree of adversarialism.
Obviously, one cannot simply remove the adversarial procedures
without substituting some other means of fact finding and determination,
or else reducing the likelihood of the AAT, making the correct and
preferable decision on the true facts. Unless tribunal members are
trained and ready to use inquisitorial powers, and have sufficient
resources to do so, and unless their use will be accepted by the
community they serve, there is little point in criticising a tribunal for
adopting an adversarial system.
The Administrative Review Council ("ARC"), in its report No. 39,
"Better Decisions - Review of Commonwealth Merits Review
Tribunals, " at paragraph 3.36, pointed out that European judges using
an inquisitorial approach are generally given extensive training over a
long period.267 This is to ensure that they are able effectively to extract
265. Gov't Ins. Office of New South Wales v. Glascock (Unreported, Court of Appeals
of New South Wales, Mahoney JA).
266. Id.
267. Administrative Review Counsel, Better Decisions - Review of Commonwealth
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all information relevant to the decision in question, using an active
investigative approach, without risking their appearance of impartiality
and fairness. The ARC in Chapter 5 made recommendations as to the
training to be given to tribunal members to enable them to perform that
task.268
Not only tribunal members require training. It is also appropriate to
train those lawyers who will be involved in representing parties before
tribunals as to the validity of inquisitorial procedures. Law courses
should include a proper appreciation of inquisitorial models of systems
of justice. Young lawyers brought up in the Anglo-American culture
should no longer be educated to believe that there is greater virtue in an
adversarial hearing than in an inquisitorial hearing. The Bond
University Mediation Course I attended used a very effective video. It
showed mediation in progress and every now and again the script posed
a predicament for the mediator. The video stopped and students from
the course were asked what they would do at that point if they were the
mediator. It was an excellent teaching tool and it made the students
appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of each possible course of
action and the validity of different viewpoints. A case which
demonstrates the conflict between finding out the truth and maintaining
a mere umpire's role is Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enterprises Inc. 2 69 It poses a predicament suitable for
such a course. Business Guides took action against Chromatic
Communications claiming copyright infringement and seeking a
temporary restraining order.27" Business Guides published directories
for eighteen specialized areas of retail trade.2 7' In an effort to protect its
directories against copying, it deliberately planted bits of false
information known as "seeds." The reasons for decision were: "Some
seeds consist of minor alterations in otherwise accurate listings -
transposed numbers in an address or zip code, or a misspelled name -
while others take the form of wholly fictitious listings describing non
existent businesses. "272
Business Guides regarded the presence of seeds in a competitor's
directory as evidence of copyright infringement. 273  At the hearing,
there was an affidavit charging Chromatic with copying as evidenced
Merits Review Tribunal, para. 3.36, available at http://www.law.gov.au/publications/
better-decisions/chapters/chap3.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
268. Id. at paras. 5.2 - 5.95.
269. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
270. Id. at 535-36.
271. Id. at 535.
272. Id.
273. Id.
by the presence of ten seeds in Chromatic's directory.2 74 The affidavit
identified the ten listings in the Business Guide's directory, but did not
pinpoint the seed in each listing.275 Three days before the hearing, the
Judge's law clerk phoned the solicitors for Business Guides asking the
firm to specify what was incorrect about each listing.2 76 He was
advised that Business Guides was retracting its claims of copying three
of the seeds.2 77 "The District Court considered this suspicious and so
conducted its own investigation into the allegations of copying. The
District Judge's law clerk spent one hour telephoning the businesses
named in the seeded listings only to discover that nine of the ten listings
contained no incorrect information."278 However, before the Court
advised the parties of those inquiries made by the law clerk, Business
Guides' solicitor prepared an affidavit identifying seven listings and
explained precisely what part of each listing supposedly contained
seeded information.279 It seems that the solicitor found that one listing
did not in fact reflect any incorrect material so at that stage there were
actually only six false listings.28°
At the hearing, the District Court, on the basis of its discovery that
nine of the original ten listings contained no incorrect information,
denied the application for a temporary restraining order.281 The matter
was referred to a Magistrate to determine whether Rule Eleven sanctions
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be imposed against
the solicitor who swore the affidavit claiming there were ten seeds in the
defendant's directory.282
There is no suggestion in the report that the Court did not act
reasonably in having the judge's clerk spend an hour checking the
accuracy of the purported seeds. I doubt very much whether a Court
here would do so. Yet it would not be surprising if a small business,
such as Chromatic Communications, which was a company operating
out of a garage, did not have the time to arrange for a detailed check of
the accuracy of the entries alleged to be seeds and simply relied on
denying that they had used the plaintiff s directions.
Another matter where normally inadmissible critical evidence was
274. Id at 536.
275. Id.
276. Id
277. Id.
278. Id
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 537.
282. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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taken into account by an administrative decision-maker was Shulver v.
Sherry.2 83 The Supreme Court of Victoria heard an application to set
aside a decision to cancel the licence of the applicants to run a child care
center. 284 The ground relied on was that hearsay evidence of parents as
to what their children had told them ought not to have been admitted
into evidence at the inquiry. The children were not competent to testify
on account of their very young age of between two and five years. 285
Judge Hayne wrote:
I consider that it is clear that the question presented is
not to be answered by considering only whether the
evidence upon which the decision-maker acted was
evidence of a kind that could have been admitted in a
court applying the rules of evidence. Rather, the inquiry
is one about whether the material upon which the
decision-maker has acted was material that, as a matter
of logic or reason, supported the finding made ...
Accordingly, the mere fact that the parents gave
evidence of what their children had told them and that
the statements of the children thus reported were treated
as evidence of the truth of the contents of those
statements does not of itself mean that a decision
founded upon the substantial accuracy of what the
children had said is manifestly unreasonable. What the
children said was material which as a matter of logic
tended to support the conclusion reached by the
respondent.28 6
His Honour pointed out that in addition to the parents' evidence,
there was medical evidence that three of the girls aged three to four
years had signs of damage to the hymen.287 The prospect of that
damage being caused by any other trauma or explained by congenital
abnormality or being self-inflicted was so remote as to be well beyond
the bounds of probability.288 Accordingly, it was probable that the three
girls had been sexually abused.28 9 His Honour concluded, "While it is
283. Shulver v. Sherry (1992) 28 A.L.D. 570.
284. Id
285. Id
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. Id
288. Id
289. Id
true that the children were not and could not be cross-examined the
applicants were given every opportunity that could be given to them to
challenge the veracity of the statements that were reported. 29 °
Would it have been preferable to have excluded the childrens'
hearsay evidence, even though the result may have been that the center
would have continued operating?
I am sure there are many cases in the criminal area where relevant
evidence has been excluded on the grounds that it does not comply with
the rules of evidence. I do not have the expertise to address that area. I
consider that there needs to be a focus in legal education on achieving
justice. This requires an explanation of how that aim is assisted by a
court or a tribunal adopting an inquisitorial approach, and how the truth
may remain hidden if the matter is left to adversarial procedures. Others
may comment that the fact that we are all seeking truth and justice is so
obvious it is not worth mentioning. In my experience, when it is not
mentioned, it may be overlooked when people start evaluating different
procedures or methods of case management.
(ii) Budget Implications
Of course, we do not only need further training in law schools. While
we wait for our new graduates to become decision-makers, current
judges and tribunal members should be offered similar intensive training
focusing on situations which arise in daily practice. Unfortunately, the
high cost of taking judges and tribunal members away from their normal
daily duties makes it unlikely that such training will occur at anything
other than a superficial level. The cost problems are of increasing
importance as our governments adopt an economic rationalism model,
particularly in respect of a federal tribunal where travel and
accommodation costs would be significant.
Because of the effect of budget cuts in reducing the availability of
legal aid, it is becoming more important for courts and tribunals to be
ready and to have the means to take steps to advise unrepresented parties
how to prepare their case for a hearing.
The fact that assisting unrepresented applicants imposes an increasing
burden on courts and tribunals was recognised by the High Court in
Cachia v. Hanes,29' where the High Court said:
290. Id
291. (1994) 179 C.L.R. 403, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
cases/cth/high%5fct/I 79clr403.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
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Whilst the right of a litigant to appear in person is
fundamental, it would be disregarding the obvious to fail
to recognise that the presence of litigants in person in
increasing numbers is creating a problem for the courts.
It would be mere pretence to regard the work done by
most litigants in person in the preparation and conduct of
their cases as the equivalent of work done by qualified
legal representatives. All too frequently, the burden of
ensuring that the necessary work of a litigant in person is
done falls on the court administration or the court itself.
Even so, litigation involving a litigant in person is
usually less efficiently conducted and tends to be
prolonged. The costs of legal representation for the
opposing litigant are increased and the drain upon court
resources is considerable.292
Although an inquisitorial approach is not going to save courts and
tribunals money, it should reduce the amount of expenditure on
litigation by the community as a whole. Unfortunately, this is hard to
establish and so does not impress those responsible for budget
allocations. The fact that an inquisitorial approach may add to the
budget expenditure of a court or tribunal means that, in the current
culture of budget cuts and competition, those who have criticized the
AAT as too adversarial, may find that they appreciate an effective
inquisitorial approach by tribunals even less. Unless a tribunal is
properly resourced, both financially and in terms of the appropriate staff,
it will not to be effective if it uses inquisitorial procedures. If review of
decisions is important, the reviewing body must have the resources to
investigate matters which it considers relevant to deciding whether or
not the decision being reviewed was the correct and preferable decision.
(iii) Improvement in Use of Expert Witnesses
The single most important move would be to start using tribunal
expert medical witnesses in many cases rather than allowing each party
to choose their own medical witnesses to express polarised views. For
the Tribunal to call its own experts would cost significant amounts of
money. However, if that saved respondents calling such witnesses,
other Commonwealth bodies would save money in calling their own
witnesses, and where an applicant is successful in a compensation
matter, in paying for the applicant's expert witnesses. To implement
292. Id. at para. 22 (citations omitted).
such a program would take a lot of work and would require co-operation
from the medical and legal professions, but I think it would be
worthwhile. I would place great reliance on treating doctors, but where
necessary, I would like to have expert witnesses called by the Tribunal
to give further expert opinions.
(iv) Concern About Increasing Adversarialism
As all government departments and authorities are looking for ways
they can cut costs, one way seems to be to reduce the amount paid out
by way of compensation. If this is done by genuinely reviewing
entitlement, no problem arises. However, occasionally it seems to be
done on the basis that a decision is made ceasing a person's entitlement
to compensation simply because he or she has been paid compensation
for a long time. Alternatively, a claim may be rejected without a
thorough consideration of the possible grounds of entitlement. An
example of that problem arose recently in a matter where compensation
was claimed for a stroke suffered at work. The solicitor for the
applicant was seeking medical evidence to establish a link between
stress at work and the stroke. In a telephone directions hearing, I
referred the solicitor to Williams v. Australian and Overseas
Telecommunications Corp.,293 and suggested that she may wish to
consider an argument, based on that decision, that the stroke was an
"injury simpliciter," sustained at work, so that the applicant may be
entitled to compensation under section 6(1)(b)(1) of the Safety
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988.294
The solicitor, acting for the respondent, objected to me making that
suggestion. I pointed out that if we had made it to the hearing, I might
have felt obliged to raise the matter at that stage. No doubt that would
have required an adjournment. It was in the hope of saving such delay
that I made the suggestion I did at the time.
In view of the objection by respondent's solicitor, I refused to hear
the matter, but the discussion caused me concern. It would not be the
correct or preferable outcome that an applicant should fail to obtain
compensation to which he or she may be entitled because a previous
decision in point was overlooked or because an applicant's case was
inadequately presented. The correct and preferable decision would be
293. (1993) 17 A.A.R. 308, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/
unrep5053.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
294. Id
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less likely to be made if the applicant's solicitor did not know of all the
ways in which the applicant's case could properly be stated. The
solicitor for the respondent may have overlooked these considerations.
By the time the matter came on for hearing before one of my colleagues,
the High Court in Zickar v. MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd.29 5 had
delivered a decision which added considerable authority to the tentative
suggestion I had made. a96 The applicant succeeded in the matter on the
ground suggested.
The second example concerned a claim that an employee's death was
related to asbestos exposure at his workplace. It so happened that the
deceased employee's son worked for the same administering authority.
I was told at a directions hearing that he had advised the solicitor acting
for the estate of his father that a unit had been set up to research asbestos
exposure in that work place. Counsel for the respondent authority
undertook at the directions hearing that his client would make the
relevant information available to the applicant's solicitor.
At a further directions hearing eight weeks later, I was informed that
not all the relevant information had yet been located by the
administering authority and that it could take a further few weeks. I
asked if the son might not be able to help identify the relevant material.
The solicitor for the respondent authority told me that his client might
take action against the son if he did so. He said that he did not want to
put the son under that pressure. I suggested that I did not see how a
compensation administering authority could properly try to prevent an
employee identifying material that might assist an applicant in
establishing an entitlement to compensation. The solicitor for the
respondent authority explained that there were "financial considerations
involved" and that was the reason for his client's attitude.
The suggestion that an administering authority, by reason of financial
considerations, may punish a fellow employee for assisting an applicant
in the preparation of a compensation matter is extremely troubling. It
seems to show a totally inappropriate reliance on adversarialism on the
part of a government authority.
CONCLUSION
If we are going to leave the bad days of excessive adversarialism
295. (1996) 140 A.L.R. 156, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
other/hca/transcripts/1995/$51/1 .html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
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behind us, it is important that government departments and authorities
also adopt a non-adversarial approach. If the desire to save money leads
departments and administering authorities to try to stop relevant material
from coming before the Tribunal, then the AAT or any other decision-
maker will be unable to reach the correct and preferable decision. If
relevant material exists, a decision made without it will be made on
inadequate material, at whatever level it is made. As Justice Brennan
stated, "the notion of onus of proof.. .has no part to play in these
administrative proceedings. "297 In an adversary system, the party
bearing an onus of proof must establish the necessary facts, using if
need be the compulsory process of discovery of documents and
interrogatories to compel disclosure of facts within his opponent's
knowledge. We are not in such a system. The AAT is entitled to expect
that the decision-maker will make all relevant material available to the
Tribunal and the other party. When the AAT stands in the shoes of the
primary decision-maker, it should have available to it all information
bearing on the decision which is available to the respondent. Good
administration requires no less.
The AAT has shown in many cases that it can use its procedures to
seek the truth as the basis for the correct and preferable decision. It has
shown that fair play between the parties does not require and may not be
compatible with the adversarial way. To achieve a fair outcome, it may
be necessary for the AAT to direct the inquiry to adopt an inquisitorial
mode.
There is a concern when radical changes are mooted that they may
destroy rather than enhance the benefits of the existing system. It is
important that the AAT, or if it is to be replaced, the ART, retain the
flexible procedures currently available. Those procedures have been
used in innovative ways to be fair to the parties by seeking out the truth.
Hopefully the current climate of cultural change will not preclude the
recognition of that aim as an important feature of any system of
administrative review.
297. Bushell v. Repatriation Comm'n (1992) 175 C.L.R. 408, 424-25 (emphasis added).
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